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I. INTRODUCTION 
[1] Transportation networks constitute “the circulatory system of our 
economy.”1  The distinct modes that constitute the American 
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transportation system—air, rail, transit, highways, and waterways—impact 
the entire range of our daily activities.2  Just as the human body depends 
on its circulatory system for life and well being, the United States’ vitality 
would grind to a halting stop without a vibrant transportation system. 
 
[2] Ongoing globalization, population growth, and urbanization 
continue to overload transportation systems in this country and around the 
world.3  As a result, our transportation system relies on advancing 
technology and its applications to sustain its operation in response to 
modern demands.4  However, an unintended consequence of this increased 
reliance on technology is the widespread collection of vehicular, personal, 
and company data for the delivery of services.5  Consequently, 
concerns exist as to whether all of the personal data being collected is 
actually necessary, whether it contains sensitive personal information, 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
† The authors would like to thank Ray D. Pethtel, Transportation Fellow and Interim 
Executive Director of the I-81 Coalition, and Gene Hetherington, Doctoral Candidate and 
Graduate Assistant at the Virginia Tech Transportation Institute in Blacksburg, Va. for 
their generous assistance with this article.  This article grew out of our research for the 
previously published Policy Paper, “A Policy Review of the Impact of Existing Privacy 
Principles have on Current and Emerging Transportation Safety Technology”.  
 
1 IBM CORP., THE CASE FOR SMARTER TRANSPORTATION 2 (2010) [hereinafter IBM, 
SMARTER TRANSPORTATION], available at http://www-07.ibm.com/innovation/my 
/exhibit/documents/pdf/2_The_ Case_For_Smarter_Transportation.pdf. 
 
2 Id. 
 
3 Id. 
 
4 See id. at 5 (discussing the importance of digital technology to “model future demand, 
capacity, cost and impacts”). 
 
5 See Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy on the Open Road, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 295, 296 
(2004). 
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such as bank account and Social Security numbers, and whether it is 
managed to safeguard personal privacy.6  
 
[3] Advancing technologies have increased the transportation system’s 
capacities, but have also provided more opportunities and methods to 
invade an individual’s privacy interests.7  The escalating issue of personal 
privacy threats caused by transportation technologies has raised questions 
as to how to protect a traveler’s privacy interests, if the interests deserve 
protection at all.8  In 2009, Missouri state senator Jim Lembke introduced 
a bill to ban the increasing use of red light cameras.9  He argued: “We’ve 
got a real problem with these red light cameras and how they infringe 
upon our constitutional rights.  Rights to privacy, rights to equal protection 
under the law, rights to do [sic] process and the right to confront our 
accuser.”10  
                                                            
6 See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: 
Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX.  L. 
REV. 1349, 1387 (2004) (discussing how new highway technologies can provide 
“invaluable information on traffic, weather, and road conditions,” but can also, in many 
cases, collect personal information about the “movements and driving habits of particular 
drivers”); see also Benjamin Burnham, Comment, Hitching a Ride: Every Time You Take 
a Drive, the Government Is Riding with You, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1499, 1513 (2006) 
(discussing how personal data collected through electronic tollway systems, such as E-
ZPass, have been subpoenaed by private lawyers in divorce cases). 
 
7 See Glancy, supra note 5, at 296. 
 
8 See Frank Douma & Jordan Deckenbach, The Challenge of ITS for the Law of Privacy, 
2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 295, 328.  
 
9 Joel O. Christensen, Note, Wrong on Red: The Constitutional Case Against Red-Light 
Cameras, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 443, 460-61 (2010) (discussing the presence of legal 
concerns about red lights in Missouri since 2006); Press Release, Mo. Senate, Senator 
Jim Lembke Introduces His First Bills in Mo. Senate (Jan. 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.senate.mo.gov/09info/members/newsrel/d01/012109.pdf. 
 
10 Outlawing Red Light Cameras Proposed in Senate Committee (NewsRadio 1120 
KMOX News radio broadcast Feb. 18, 2009) (transcript on file with Missouri Digital 
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[4] Historically, the American people have held personal privacy as a 
sacred value, a result of either our historical roots as British colonies or 
our rugged individualism.11  For whatever reason, the United States has a 
long-standing perception that the protection of personal sensitive 
information is an absolute right of citizenship.12  That is, of course, not the 
case.  There is no specific constitutional right to privacy, but there are 
numerous case decisions and individual statutes that bear on the question 
of whether, and to what extent, a citizen’s expectation of privacy exists.13  
This article will elaborate on the question of whether a member of the 
traveling public carries a legally protected privacy right in the 
transportation arena.     
 
[5] As this article already pointed out, a vibrant transportation system 
is fundamental to the commercial operations, the security, and the overall 
health and vitality of the United States and its society.14  In recent years, 
                                                                                                                                                    
News), available at http://mdn.org/2009/stories/ 
redlight.htm. 
 
11 See James M. Rosenbaum, In Defense of the Hard Drive, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 169, 170 
(2001) (“In the years leading to the Revolutionary War, the British used general searches 
as a way to root out anti-English traitors and sympathizers.  The citizens of the nascent 
Republic found these searches wholly unreasonable.”); Amanda Christine Dake, 
Comment, The Application of “Out-of-Hospital” Do not Resuscitate Order Legislation to 
Commercial Airline Travel, 63 J. AIR L. & COM. 443, 455-56 (1997) (“[B]ecause 
historically Americans have understood personal privacy to involve a ‘right to be let 
alone,’ the right of privacy exemplifies basic tenets of ‘the American way of life’ and 
vision of liberalism, or, rather, dedication to individualism, the rule of law, and freedom 
from unwarranted governmental intrusions into individuals’ private affairs.”) (quoting 
DAVID M. O'BRIEN, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY– ITS CONSTITUTIONAL & SOCIAL 
DIMENSIONS: A COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY, at ii (1980)). 
12 See DAVID SADOFSKY, THE QUESTION OF PRIVACY IN PUBLIC POLICY: AN ANALYSIS 
OF THE REAGAN-BUSH ERA  1 (1993) (“Three out of four Americans were discovered to 
believe the ‘right of privacy’ should be akin to the inalienable rights to life, liberty and 
the pursuit of happiness, the traditional promises of the Declaration of Independence.”). 
 
13 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing various Supreme Court 
decisions that recognized a right to privacy under the Constitution). 
 
14 See IBM, SMARTER TRANSPORTATION, supra note 1, at 2. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology     Volume XVIII, Issue1 
 
 5 
the development of transportation-related technologies has become the 
focus of more and more business operations, and with that the issue of the 
legal protection of individual privacy in the face of these technological 
developments has earned increased scrutiny.15  Moreover, in the post 9/11 
era, the issue of national security has focused primarily on specific 
transportation modes: air, rail and highways.16  This has placed greater 
emphasis on national security which has, at times, collided with the 
protection of an individual’s privacy interests while traveling.17  This 
article examines the impact that advancing transportation technology has 
on the traveling public’s expectation of privacy, as well as how the United 
States Supreme Court, the Congress, the courts in Virginia and the 
General Assembly of Virginia have addressed privacy claims in a host of 
situations.  These statutory requirements and judicial opinions will be 
discussed and analyzed, concluding that a critical outcome of emerging 
transportation technology has been the narrowing and eroding of the scope 
of legally protected privacy interests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
15 See Blitz, supra note 6, at 1387; Douma & Deckenbach, supra note 8, at 296; see also 
Burnham, supra note 6, at 1499. 
 
16 See Kyle P. Hanson, Note, Suspicionless Terrorism Checkpoints Since 9/11: Searching 
for Uniformity, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 171, 172-75 (2007).  See generally John W. Whitehead 
& Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom" for "Homeland Security": A 
Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the Justice Department's Anti-
Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081, 1108 (2002) (examining the USA Patriot 
Act's effect on private protections).   
 
17 See Hanson, supra note 16, at 172-75 (providing examples of instances where travelers 
are subjected to “suspicionless searches”). 
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II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
 
A. United States Supreme Court Decisions 
 
[6] Neither the U.S. Constitution, nor the Bill of Rights, contains 
explicit provisions for the protection of privacy.18  However, the Supreme 
Court of the United States in Griswold v. Connecticut famously 
recognized that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras” 
that “create zones of privacy.”19  The Griswold Court noted that “facets of 
privacy” appear within the First Amendment’s right of association, the 
Third Amendment’s “prohibition against the quartering of soldiers ‘in any 
house,’” the Fourth Amendment’s protection from unreasonable 
government search and seizure, and the Fifth Amendment’s protection 
from self incrimination that “enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy 
which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment.”20  
The Court explained that, when reading these penumbrae together with the 
Ninth Amendment’s assurance that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, 
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others,” the 
Constitution arguably reserves a tacit right of privacy.21  After Griswold 
and the Supreme Court’s ostensible nod in the direction of accepting a 
general right to privacy, the Court seemingly has limited its Griswold 
pronouncement to zones of privacy concerning familial and personal 
relationships, rather than expanding the right to an individual’s control of 
information dissemination.22  Contributing further questions and 
                                                            
18 Roe, 410 U.S. at 172. 
 
19 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (concluding that a state statute 
criminalizing contraceptive use by married couples intruded into a zone of marital 
privacy where the government may not tread).  
 
20 Id. at 484. 
 
21 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IX). 
 
22 Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis’s Right to Privacy, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 
643, 644 (2007) (“[T]he controversy over reproductive privacy decisions makes 
expansion of [informational] privacy protections unlikely for the foreseeable future.  This 
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contradictions, constitutional scholars also disagree whether privacy 
actually is a valid legal concept.23   
 
[7] For example, in Katz v. United States, the Court ruled that the use 
of electronic surveillance in a public telephone booth without a search 
warrant violated the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable 
search and seizure and affirmed that the Fourth Amendment’s protection 
extends to public places.24  The Court later noted in United States v. Miller 
that individuals had no expectation of privacy for information supplied 
voluntarily for commercial uses.25  Thereafter, in Whalen v. Roe, the Court 
attempted to define a balance between the interests of privacy and the 
government’s operations.26  In Whalen, the Court ruled that New York 
State had the right to collect data about individuals and create a database if 
for the public good and with adequate security measures taken to protect 
the privacy and identification of individuals.27  As part of this ruling, the 
Court recognized and defined what it called a “zone of privacy” in which 
an individual may have the expectation of the nondisclosure of personal 
                                                                                                                                                    
is unfortunate, and even tragic, because technology for learning and disseminating highly 
personal things about individuals poses an unprecedented risk of invasion of privacy.”). 
 
23 Compare ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION 
OF THE LAW 95-96, 199-206, 210-13 (1990) (“Related to . . . Tribe’s discussion of rights 
of privacy and personhood . . . are rights of individual autonomy which inhere in the 
Constitution because that document is claimed to have an implicit idea of what it means 
to be fully human.  Quite aside from the dubious nature of that assertion, Tribe’s version 
of what being human is turns out to be an extreme form of modern liberalism’s moral 
relativism.”), with LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 12-13 (1985) (“A 
substantive concern for individual privacy necessarily underpins the Fourth 
Amendment.”).   
 
24 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1967). 
 
25 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976). 
 
26 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591-95, 600-02 (1977). 
 
27 See id. at 605-06. 
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matters and “independence in making certain kinds of important 
decisions.”28 
 
[8] Relative to transportation privacy, the Court in Delaware v. Prouse 
agreed that without “at least [an] articulable and reasonable suspicion that 
a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that 
either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for 
violation of law,” law enforcement could not randomly stop vehicles to 
check for valid license and registration.29  The Court articulated that “an 
individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all 
reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its 
use are subject to government regulation.”30  Nonetheless, the Prouse 
Court curtailed broad privacy protections for individual drivers when it 
recognized that, even without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, 
constitutionally acceptable methods for stopping vehicles exist.31  As long 
as police officers do not have “the unbridled discretion” to stop any 
random vehicle, instead maintaining a systemic “[q]uestioning of all 
oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops,” then such stops pass 
constitutional muster.32 
 
[9] A mere four years following the Prouse decision, the Court 
reigned in privacy protections again when it found that “[a] person 
travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”33  In 
United States v. Knotts, the police put a tracking device on a container of 
                                                            
28 Id. at 598-600. 
 
29 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). 
 
30 Id. at 662. 
 
31 See id. at 663. 
 
32 Id. 
 
33 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). 
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chemicals picked up and transported in a car without first obtaining a 
warrant.34  Following the tracking device signal to a secluded cabin in the 
woods, the police conducted visual surveillance for three days before 
obtaining a search warrant for the cabin.35  The Court took no exception to 
the police’s tactics and found that the “beeper signals complained of by 
respondent [did not] invade any legitimate expectation of privacy,” and 
thus “there was neither a ‘search’ nor a ‘seizure’ within the contemplation 
of the Fourth Amendment.”36  In response to respondent’s argument and 
warning that holding in the government’s favor may mean that “twenty-
four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country will be possible, 
without judicial knowledge or supervision,”37 the Court commented that it 
has “never equated police efficiency with unconstitutionality.”38  Given 
the compendium of the Prouse and Knotts holdings, it almost goes without 
mention that the High Court has established a generally accepted maxim 
that persons traveling in vehicles on public highways have significantly 
diminished expectation of any right to privacy.39 
 
[10] These Supreme Court decisions painted the backdrop for 
individual privacy protections leading up to the technological explosion, 
and created, at best, a muddled legal standard for privacy.40  This issue 
                                                            
34 Id. at 278-79. 
 
35 Id. 
 
36 Id. at 285. 
 
37 Id. at 283. 
 
38 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284. 
 
39 See Robert H. Whorf, “Coercive Ambiguity” in the Routine Traffic Stop Turned 
Consent Search, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379, 397 (1997) (“The United States Supreme 
Court’s greatly diminished view of Fourth Amendment privacy protection for motorists 
on public roadways is not in accord with the reality of citizens’ use and view of their 
cars.”). 
 
40 Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 656 (discussing the “unprecedented access to 
information about individuals,” and the serious need for “judicial protection of a 
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became even more complex with the development of emerging 
technologies—such as camera-based applications, satellite 
communications and tracking, electronic databases, and the Internet—that 
facilitate the collection and storage of personal information.41  Moreover, 
in the post 9/11 era, the threats to national security by terrorist groups and 
others have led to a heightened emphasis on homeland security.42  This 
focus on security has further eroded already uncertain legal protections for 
an individual’s expectation of privacy in his/her personal data.43  While 
the Supreme Court has addressed several cases arising from privacy 
protection challenges to technological innovation,44 the development of 
the law in the transportation arena has occurred primarily by congressional 
enactments and the regulatory framework.45 
                                                                                                                                                    
constitutional right to informational privacy and greater safeguards through tort law and 
statutes”). 
 
41 See id. (“Computerized records and databases store information in a way that it can be 
accessed by others.  The Internet makes it potentially available to many.”). 
 
42 See Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., Homeland Security Challenges of Global Climate Change, 54 
LOY. L. REV. 800, 812 (2008) (“To say ‘the world has changed after 9/11,’ is an 
understatement, especially regarding the importance of making the proper access 
decisions.  Indeed, national awakening to this threat after 9/11 is what prompted the 
placement of [Citizenship and Immigration Services (“CIS”)] within the Department of 
Homeland Security in the first place.”). 
 
43 See, e.g., Whitehead & Aden, supra note 16, at 1108 (examining the USA Patriot Act’s 
effect on privacy protections and noting that requests to install wiretaps to record private 
conversations now are “virtually never denied”). 
 
44 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (upholding privacy expectations in 
communications made on electronic equipment owned by a government employer); Reno 
v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (finding that the South Carolina department of motor 
vehicles’ requirement that automobile owners provide personal information as a 
condition of obtaining a driver’s license or registering a vehicle, and the selling of this 
personal data for revenue, are in conflict with Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994). 
 
45 See Douma & Deckenbach, supra note 8, at 305 (“Although there is not a single 
comprehensive privacy statute or constitutional provision in the United States, statutes 
have been passed to address specific privacy concerns.  In many cases, these have 
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B. Federal and State Statutes and Regulations 
 
[11] Whether there is a causal relationship between the events of 9/11 
and the “explosion” of technology in the security arena is an important 
analysis that is beyond the scope of this research.  However, it is 
incontrovertible that efforts to improve the technologies attendant to data 
security, especially in the transportation arena, have given rise to 
increasing concern for privacy protection.46  The development of now 
commonplace technologies such as sophisticated electronics, computers, 
and the wireless Internet have provided capabilities that previous 
generations could only dream of and many in our current society can 
barely comprehend.47  Whether due to the fear of the unknown or the 
understanding of the known, technological advancements have triggered 
citizen concern and Congress has responded with a series of enactments 
which, in turn, have resulted in regulatory promulgations.48  While an 
exhaustive discussion of congressional action would prove formidable, the 
following is an overview of the landscape. 
 
[12] Title 6 of the United States Code, Domestic Security, establishes 
the Department of Homeland Security.49  Chapter 4 of Title 6 provides the 
statutory framework for transportation security including: surface 
                                                                                                                                                    
stemmed from public outcry over a revealed gap in privacy laws; accordingly, they 
address only those specific instances of privacy concerns.”).  
 
46 See generally id. at 305-06, 308-10, 326. 
 
47 Cf. Robin Cowan, High Technology and the Economics of Standardization, U. W. 
ONTARIO, 12 (May 27-28, 1991), http://www.cgl.uwaterloo.ca/~racowan/High 
TechStand.pdf (presented at the International Conference on Social and Institutional 
Factors Shaping Technological Development: Technology at the Outset) (“It may be . . . 
very difficult to predict what properties [technologies] will have in the future.”). 
 
48 See generally Douma & Deckenbach, supra note 8, at 305 (citing as an example the 
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2006)). 
 
49 6 U.S.C. § 111. 
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transportation security,50 railroad security,51 and over-the-road-bus and 
trucking security.52  In each of these areas, Congress has mandated that the 
Secretary of Homeland Security identify risks and areas of vulnerability, 
as well as promote research into tactics and strategies for mitigating the 
risks and addressing emergency situations should they occur.53  
 
[13] Of particular relevance to this discussion is the language in Title 6, 
wherein Congress authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
permit “deploying, equipping, and utilizing tracking technology . . . for 
motor carriers transporting security-sensitive materials” in order to collect, 
display, and store information regarding the movements and locations of 
shipments and vehicles.54  Moreover, this section enables the “installation 
by a motor carrier of concealed electronic devices . . . activated by law 
enforcement authorities to disable the vehicle or alert emergency response 
resources to locate and recover security-sensitive materials . . . .”55 
 
[14] Included in Title 49 of the United States Code is a provision that 
“the Secretary of Homeland Security shall develop, prepare, implement 
and update . . . (A) National Strategy for Transportation Security; and (B) 
transportation modal security plans” addressing security risks including 
threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences for “aviation, bridge and tunnel, 
commuter rail and ferry, highway, maritime, pipeline, rail, mass transit, 
                                                            
50 See 6 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1208 (Supp. III 2010). 
 
51 See id. §§ 1161-1172. 
 
52 See id. §§ 1181-1186. 
 
53 See id. §§ 1101-1186. 
 
54 Id. § 1204(a)(2)(C)(i) (Supp. III 2010). 
 
55 6 U.S.C. § 1204(a)(2)(C)(v) (Supp. III 2010).  This type of legislation—according to 
those advocates who fear the misuse and abuse of secretly tracking motor vehicles for 
any purposes—further erodes the right to privacy for all members of the traveling public.  
See Glancy, supra note 5, at 295-96.  The discussion will return to motor vehicle tracking 
by law enforcement officials in Part III. 
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over-the-road bus, and other public transportation infrastructure assets.”56  
The statute further provides that the Secretary of Homeland Security and 
the Transportation Secretary shall work jointly to develop, revise and 
update the National Security Strategy by identifying “transportation assets 
in the United States that . . . must be protected from attack or disruption by 
terrorists or other hostile forces . . . .”57 
 
[15] In the area of motor vehicles, traditionally a state law jurisdiction, 
the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA) prohibits the release 
and use of certain personal information from state motor vehicle records.58  
The statute prohibits the state motor vehicles department from disclosing 
personal information, including photographs, social security numbers, and 
any personally identifying data to any entity or person without the consent 
of the individual to whom the information applies.59  Congress did create 
an exception, however, in cases where personal information is sought for 
such reasons as “motor vehicle or driver safety and theft, motor vehicle 
emissions, motor vehicle product alterations, recalls, or advisories,” or law 
enforcement purposes.60  
 
[16] Dorothy Glancy, in her seminal discussion of privacy issues 
encountered by citizens on America’s highways, concluded with a review 
of a California statute that mandates automobile manufacturers to disclose 
the presence of event data recorder (EDR) mechanisms in the owner’s 
manuals of new automobiles manufactured after July 1, 2004, and sold or 
leased in the state of California.61  These EDR “black boxes” have the 
                                                            
56 49 U.S.C. § 114(s)(1)(A)-(B) (Supp. III 2010). 
 
57 Id. § 114(t)(3)(A). 
 
58 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2006). 
 
59 Id. §§ 2721, 2725(4). 
 
60 Id. § 2721(b)(1); see also Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 145 (2000). 
 
61 Glancy, supra note 5, at 374 (citing CAL. VEH. CODE § 9951 (Deering, LEXIS through 
2011 Sess.)). 
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capacity to collect and record information from the vehicle such as speed, 
direction, travel history, seatbelt use by the driver, and accident-related 
data.62  The statute further requires that data may only be released with the 
consent of the owner for certain types of research about safety issues, or in 
response to a lawful court order. 63  Glancy hypothesized that, given the 
California statute’s level of privacy protection for EDR data, when “other 
types of information derived from the activities of people on the open road 
[is collected], protection for the privacy interests of roadway users will be 
further reinforced.”64 
 
[17] Since 2004, twelve other states have enacted a statute similar to 
California’s “black box” legislation, which indicates that Glancy’s 
hypothesis was, at least in part, accurate.65  As with the California statute, 
these twelve state statutes require the owner’s consent prior to releasing 
data.66  Exceptions include: (1) release pursuant to a valid court order or 
search warrant; (2) release for research purposes; or (3) release for 
diagnostic purposes, such as servicing or repairing the motor vehicle.67   
                                                                                                                                                    
 
62 Id. 
 
63 Id. at 375. 
 
64 Id. 
 
65 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-112-107 (2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-6-402 (2010); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-164aa (Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, §§ 1972-
1973 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484D.485 (Lexis-Nexis 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 357-G:1 (LexisNexis 2011); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 416-b (Consol. Supp. 
2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-07-28 (2011); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 105.928, .932, .935, 
.938, .942, .945 (2009); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 547.615 (West 2011); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 46.2-1088.6 (West Supp. 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 46.35.020, 0.30 
(Supp. 2011). 
 
66 See sources cited supra note 65. 
 
67 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484D.485(2); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 51-07-28(2); 
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 547.615(c); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1088.6; WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 46.35.030(1)(a)-(c). 
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[18] The owner’s consent requirement receives additional bolstering in 
Oregon and North Dakota, where state statutes prohibit insurers from 
requiring the insured to provide automatic consent for the insurer to 
retrieve EDR data as a condition of obtaining an insurance policy.68  
Notably, the data can be released without the owner’s consent if “[a] law 
enforcement officer, firefighter or emergency medical services provider 
seeks to obtain the data in the course of responding to or investigating an 
emergency involving the physical injury or the risk of physical injury to 
any person.”69  Maine and Washington have similar exceptions for 
releasing vehicle data in the event of medical emergencies in order to treat 
injured individuals.70  
 
[19] A discussion of the California and other twelve state statutes sets 
the background for a discussion of other federal regulations in this area.71  
The Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, §§ 563.1 through 563.12, 
establishes “national requirements for vehicles equipped with event data 
recorders (EDRs) concerning the collection, storage, and retrievability of 
onboard motor vehicle crash event data” for vehicles manufactured after 
September 1, 2012.72  Rather than protecting driver privacy, the primary 
purposes of these regulations are: (1) addressing safety concerns; (2) 
advancing the understanding of accident causation; and (3) developing 
safer vehicle designs.73  Section 563.11 does mandate disclosure of the 
EDR device in the owner’s manual, but none of the regulatory sections 
                                                            
68 N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-07-28(6); OR. REV. STAT. § 105.932. 
 
69 OR. REV. STAT. § 105.935. 
 
70 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 1972; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.35.030(1)(d). 
 
71 See generally supra text accompanying notes 61–67 (discussing the hypothesis that 
California and other states’ “black box” legislation will enhance driver’s information 
privacy and autonomy).  
 
72 49 C.F.R. §§ 563.1, 563.3 (2010). 
 
73 See id. § 563.2. 
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specifically require the owner’s consent to release data after an accident.74  
Although no personal data, such as name, gender, age or accident location 
is recorded or released by the EDR, federal regulations explicitly 
acknowledge that law enforcement officials have access to this personal 
information in accident investigations, which could be combined with 
EDR data without an owner’s consent.75 
 
[20] The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act of 1914 granted the 
agency the power to prevent unfair business practices,76 which now 
includes the Principles of Fair Information Practices, governing 
information over the Internet.77  The FTC describes Congress’ approach to 
addressing privacy concerns as “‘sectoral,’ consisting of a handful of 
disparate statutes” that address “different commercial activities [with] 
different privacy issues.”78  Once the FTC realized the privacy concerns 
                                                            
74 See id. § 563.11. 
 
75  See id. 
 
76 See Federal Trade Commissions Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 58 (2006). 
 
77 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, 7-8 (June 1998), 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf. 
 
78 Christine A. Varney, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Privacy & 
American Business National Conference: Consumer Privacy in the Information Age: A 
View From the United States (Oct. 9, 1996); see Ray D. Pethtel, James D. Phillips & 
Gene Hetherington, A Policy Review of the Impact Existing Privacy Principles Have on 
Current and Emerging Transportation Safety Technology, THE NAT’L SURFACE TRANSP. 
SAFETY CTR. FOR EXCELLENCE, 9 (May 12, 2011), http://scholar.vt.edu/ 
VTTI/reports/PrivacyFinalReport05122011.pdf (“In 1998, Congress recognized that the 
privacy protections provided by the FTC were inadequate, describing the situation as 
‘sectoral,’ consisting of a handful of disparate statutes directed at specific industries that 
collect personal data and none of which specifically cover the general collection of 
personal information.”); see, e.g., Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 
3402 (2006) (governing individual bank records); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
1681c(a) (2006) (governing consumer credit reports); Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2006 & Supp. II 2010) (governing the disclosure 
of wire, oral, or electronic communications); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 
U.S.C. § 2710 (2006) (governing video rental records); Family Educational Rights and 
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inherent in such a fractured system they created the Principles of Fair 
Information Practices, attempting to encourage the private sector to create 
and utilize a system of self-regulation.79  The uncertainty involved with 
interpreting each of these statutes to find a common set of privacy 
standards has “conspired to create an environment where any regulation of 
privacy is not only open to an endless number of interpretations but also 
creates a liability minefield for companies that develop, manufacture and 
deploy technology that involves the collection of private information.”80  
Perhaps with the mandate from the Principles of Fair Information 
Practices, the private sector and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
will “fill the void by creating regulatory systems designed to … protect 
their institutional interests.”81  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006) (governing student records); 
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934) (current version at 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2006)) (governing information 
relating to use of telecommunication services; “customer proprietary network 
information”); Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2006)  
(governing cable television subscriber information); cf. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 
552a (2006) (governing data collected by the federal government).  Pursuant to the 
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), individuals 
have no Fourth Amendment interest in personal information they voluntarily have 
conveyed to another.  Consequently, any privacy protections for personal information 
must be legislatively grounded. 
 
79 Pethtel, Phillips & Hetherington, supra note 78, at 9; see FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra 
note 77, at 15-16. 
 
80 Pethtel, Phillips & Hetherington, supra note 78, at 9; see, e.g., Rebecca Dent, The Role 
of Banking Regulations in Data Theft and Security, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 381, 390 
(2008) (“Illinois’s Credit Card and Debit Card Liability Act would amend current Illinois 
identity theft legislation to make any data collector, such as TJX, liable to any financial 
institution for costs associated with identity theft originating with the data collector.”). 
 
81 Pethtel, Phillips & Hetherington, supra note 78, at 9-10; see FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
supra note 77, at 15 (illustrating how the “online industry” has used self-regulation to 
effectively protect online privacy). 
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[21] One example of such an effort was undertaken by a group of 
transportation equipment manufacturers who are members of the 
Intelligent Transportation Society of America (ITSA).82  Established in 
1991, ITSA is a public/private partnership dedicated to promoting the 
development and deployment of variety of intelligent transportation 
technologies.83  ITSA creates technology devices that apply to almost all 
areas of the transportation sector.84  In response to an increased concern 
over data security, the ITSA created a task force charged with studying the 
issue and offering recommendations that would address the public 
concerns about how emerging transportation technology should be 
regulated to best protect the public’s privacy interests.85  After approval 
from the ITSA’s Board, the principles were created as non-binding 
guidelines and member organizations were not compelled to comply with 
the principles, but merely to agree to take them into account in the 
development process of any new technology.86  These Privacy Principles 
                                                            
82 See Pethtel, Phillips & Hetherington, supra note 78, at 1; Membership, ITS AM., 
http://www.itsa.org/membership (last updated July. 13, 2011). 
 
83 See About ITS America, ITS AM., http://www.itsa.org/aboutus (last updated June 24, 
2011). 
 
84 See Pethtel, supra note 78, at 23 (providing multiple examples of technologies created 
by ITSA members); Connected Vehicle Insights: Trends in Machine-to-Machine 
Communications, ITS AM., 2-6 (2011), http://www.itsa.org/knowledgecenter/te 
chnologyscan (under “Current Connected Vehicle Insight Reports* under production,” 
follow either the “PDF” or “HTML” hyperlink next to “Trends in Machine-to-Machine 
Communications”) (discussing the growing field of machine-to-machine connected 
devices including their application in the transportation sector). 
 
85 See A Conversation with ITS America President David Hensing, 11 GLOBAL 
POSITIONING & NAVIGATION NEWS, no. 11 (May 30, 2001); ITS America’s Fair 
Information and Privacy Principles, ITS AM., 1-3, http://www.itsa.org/images/mediac 
enter/itsaprivacyprinciples.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2011); see also Connected Vehicles – 
Next Generation ITS, ITS AM., http://www.itsa.org/forumstaskforcesworkinggroup 
s/connectedvehicle (last updated Aug. 31, 2011). 
 
86 See ITS America’s Fair Information and Privacy Principles, ITS AM., 1, 
http://www.itsa.org/images/ mediacenter/itsaprivacyprinciples.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 
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provide an example of how membership organizations across various 
industries have made an effort to self-regulate on the issue of data security 
and privacy protection. 
 
III. THE VIRGINIAN LANDSCAPE 
 
[23] While the Virginia Constitution expresses no right of privacy, 
Article I, Section 10 protects individuals from general warrants for search 
and seizure.87  In addition, the courts in Virginia have decided a number of 
cases that address the issue of the expectation of privacy, including Atkins 
v. Commonwealth, which reiterated the standard for recognizing 
expectations of privacy.88  “[T]he test is whether the appellant objectively 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time and place of the 
disputed search.”89  A court must “look to the totality of the 
circumstances” to determine whether an expectation of privacy is 
objectively reasonable.90 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
2011) (“These principles are advisory, intended to educate and guide transportation 
professionals . . . .”). 
 
87 VA. CONST. art. 1, § 10 (“That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may 
be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to 
seize any person or persons not named, or whose offense is not particularly described and 
supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.”). 
 
88 Atkins v. Commonwealth, 698 S.E.2d 249 (Va. Ct. App. 2010). 
 
89 Id. at 254 (quoting McCoy v. Commonwealth, 343 S.E.2d. 383, 385 (Va. Ct. App. 
1986)). 
 
90 Id.  These circumstances include:  
whether the defendant has a possessory interest in . . . the place 
searched, whether he has the right to exclude others from that place, 
whether he has exhibited a subjective expectation that it would remain 
free from governmental invasion, whether he took normal precautions 
to maintain his privacy and whether he was legitimately on the 
premises. 
Id. (quoting McCoy, 343 S.E.2d at 385). 
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[24] A number of cases involving transportation apply this 
reasonableness standard, most notably as it relates to automobile searches 
using advanced technology.91  In the decision announced in Foltz v. 
Commonwealth, the court established that the placement of a Global 
Position Tracking (GPS) tracking device inside the bumper of the 
defendant’s work van did not constitute a Fourth Amendment “search” or 
“seizure” and did not violate the defendant’s privacy rights.92  Likewise, 
the court in Londono v. Commonwealth applied the standard in the area of 
public transportation.93  Here, the court held that an individual, while 
traveling on a train “does not enjoy the same expectation of privacy as he 
would at home.”94  The court went on to explain that, although “occupants 
of train roomettes may properly expect some degree of privacy,” for 
Fourth Amendment purposes, “it is less than the reasonable expectations 
that individuals rightfully possess in their homes or their hotel rooms.”95  
Also, because “passengers in sleeping cars are repeatedly subject to 
inquiry and oversight by conductors and other railroad personnel,” and 
“[i]ntrusions such as these necessarily reduce privacy interests,” an 
individual should not expect the same degree of privacy had they decided 
to stay at home.96 
 
[25] The General Assembly of Virginia has enacted several important 
statutes relating to privacy interests regarding the collection of data by the 
                                                            
91 See United States v. Hernandez, 647 F.3d 216, 219 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 273 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 
945 (6th Cir. 1980). 
 
92 See Foltz v. Commonwealth, 698 S.E.2d 281, 287, 289, 290, 292-93 (Va. Ct. App. 
2010). 
 
93 See Londono v. Commonwealth, 579 S.E.2d 641 (Va. Ct. App. 2003). 
 
94 Id. at 650 (citing United States v. Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849, 854 (4th Cir. 1988)). 
 
95 Id. (quoting Whitehead, 849 F.2d at 853). 
 
96 Id. at 650-51 (quoting Whitehead, 849 F.2d at 853).  
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government.97  The Government Data Collection and Dissemination 
Practices Act (“Data Collection Act”) recognizes that “an individual’s 
privacy is directly affected by the extensive collection, maintenance, use 
and dissemination of personal information” and acknowledges the vast 
amount of information now accessible electronically.98  As such, the Data 
Collection Act provides a cause of action for using data or acquiring it 
improperly, as well as allowing for attorneys fees and injunctive relief for 
individuals adversely impacted per the Act, thus taking steps to ensure the 
protection of privacy of individuals throughout the Commonwealth.99  
Section 2.2-3800 provides guidelines for recordkeeping agencies of the 
Commonwealth including: prohibition against secret record keeping 
systems, prohibition against collection unless there is clear notice stated in 
advance, and prohibition from collecting personal information except as 
explicitly or implicitly authorized by law.100  The Data Collection Act also 
provides individuals an effective way to correct any collected information 
about them.101  In at least one reported case, the legal standard for the 
government’s authority to collect personal data was raised.102  However, 
because the Virginia Supreme Court determined the Act did not cover the 
particular government entity, it was not necessary for the court to reach 
further into an interpretation of the statute.103  
                                                            
97 See generally Virginia Freedom of Information Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-3700 to -
3714 (2008); Government Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act, VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 2.2-3800 to -3809 (2008); Virginia Computer Crimes Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 
18.2-152.1 to -152.14 (2009).  
 
98 VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3800.  
 
99 See id. § 2.2-3809. 
 
100 Id. § 2.2-3800(C). 
 
101 Id. § 2.2-3800(C)(7). 
 
102 See Carraway v. Hill, 574 S.E.2d 274, 275 (Va. 2003). 
 
103 Id. at 276-77 (citing Connell v. Kersey, 547 S.E.2d 228, 231-32 (Va. 2001)) 
(establishing that although the city treasurer provided a newspaper reporter with 
information from a city treasury employee’s employment file, Government Data 
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[26] In the context of motor vehicles, the 2011 Session of the General 
Assembly considered and passed S. 946, a bill to augment Section 46.2-
844, which allows local school systems to install and operate a video 
monitoring system on school buses in order to detect drivers who pass a 
stopped school bus in violation of Section 46.2-859.104  The statute defines 
a “video monitoring system” as a system “with one or more camera 
sensors and computers that produces live digital and recorded video” of 
motor vehicles which passed school buses as they stop for students.105  
The section also requires the system to record an image of the license plate 
and the time, date, and location of the vehicle.106  
 
[27] The General Assembly, along with those other states who followed 
California’s lead,107 has enacted legislation regulating event data 
recorders.108  In particular, Section 46.2-1088.6 provides that only the 
owner of the vehicle or one with the consent of the owner’s agent or legal 
representative may access recorded data from a recording device.109  The 
statute defines “recording device” as “event data recorders (EDRs), 
sensing and diagnostic modules (SDMs), electronic control modules 
                                                                                                                                                    
Collection and Dissemination Practices Act did not apply to a treasurer, “a constitutional 
officer” who “is an independent public official [and] whose authority is derived from the 
Constitution of Virginia even though the duties of the office may be prescribed by 
statute”). 
 
104 2011-838 Va. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1 (LexisNexis) (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 46.2-844 (Supp. 2011)). 
 
105 VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-844(B) (Supp. 2011). 
 
106 Id. 
 
107 See generally ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 1972 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 46.35.030 (West Supp. 2011). 
 
108 See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1088.6 (2010). 
 
109 Id. § 46.2-1088.6(B). 
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(ECMs), automatic crash notification (ACN) systems, geographic 
information systems (GIS), and any other device that records and 
preserves data that can be accessed related to that vehicle.”110  
Nevertheless, this Section provides exceptions to the general rule requiring 
consent by the owner or representative.111  The statute allows for access to 
recorded data: (1) if the owner or owner’s agent has a contract with a third 
party subscription service that requires access to the device(s); (2) if a 
licensed new motor vehicle dealer, or mechanic or technician requires 
access to recorded data to perform ordinary diagnosing, servicing and 
repair duties; (3) if the recorded data is accessed by an emergency 
response provider and the data is used to perform emergency response 
services; (4) if requested by authority of a court of competent jurisdiction; 
and (5)  if the data law enforcement accesses the data in the course of a 
constitutionally permissible  investigation, in accordance with the law 
regarding searches and seizures.112  While the statute makes clear the 
scope of the permissible use of data retrieved from the recorder, there are 
no civil or criminal liability provisions to protect the owner from 
unauthorized use by “hacking in” to the data or by law enforcement acting 
beyond the scope of a Fourth Amendment search or seizure.113   
 
[28] In a pair of unpublished companion cases, Nininger v. 
Commonwealth114 and Dupree v. Commonwealth,115 law enforcement 
accessed the EDRs from a Hummer H3’s and a Chevy Avalanche “using a 
                                                            
110 Id. § 46.2-1088.6(A)(6). 
 
111 See id. § 46.2-1088.6(B)(1)-(5). 
 
112 Id. 
 
113 See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1088(B)(1)-(5).  
 
114 Nininger v. Commonwealth, No. 0450-09-3, 2010 WL 1752572 (Va. Ct. App. May 4, 
2010). 
 
115 Dupree v. Commonwealth, No. 0519-09-3, 2010 WL 1752581 (Va. Ct. App. May 4, 
2010). 
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Crash Data Retrieval System connected to the diagnostic port of the 
vehicle.”116  The data showed that Nininger was “traveling at 37 mph and 
never attempted to brake or swerve to avoid the blade of the backhoe”117 
and Dupree “was traveling at 38 mph and he applied his brakes a half-
second before he collided with Nininger.”118  Both defendants did not 
specifically contest the admissibility of the EDR data.119  These cases 
suggest that EDR data may be used by law enforcement to search and 
seize electronic evidence obtained from emerging technology.120  The 
court’s tacit acceptance of EDR data has created a variety of new legal 
issues, which in turn requires new legislation to protect the privacy rights 
of Virginia motor vehicle drivers.121   
 
[29] For example, Section 38.2-2212 provides that no insurer shall 
refuse to renew a motor vehicle insurance policy because of the refusal of 
an owner of a motor vehicle to provide access to recorded data from a 
recording device as defined by Section 46.2-1088.6.122  Section 38.2-
2213.1 also provides that when an owner does deny access to recorded 
data from a recording device, an insurer may not “reduce coverage, 
                                                            
116 Dupree, 2010 WL 1752581, at *3 n.3; Nininger, 2010 WL 1752572, at *3 n.3. 
 
117 Nininger, 2010 WL 1752572, at *3.   
 
118 Dupree, 2010 WL 1752581, at *3. 
 
119 See Nininger, 2010 WL 1752572; Dupree, 2010 WL 1752581. 
 
120 See Douma & Deckenbach, supra note 8, at 314 (“Courts, however, have manifested a 
willingness to accept data collected by these [EDR] systems in civil cases as long as it 
complies with the applicable evidentiary standard of  ‘general acceptance’ as a legitimate 
technology.”). 
 
121 See, e.g., Kevin J. Powers, David Hasselhoff No Longer Owns the Only Talking Car:  
Automotive Black Boxes in Criminal Law, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 289, 305-08 (2005) 
(discussing the Fourth and Fifth Amendment concerns implicated regarding the seizure 
and admissibility of EDR evidence in criminal cases). 
 
122 VA CODE ANN. § 38.2-2212(C)(1)(s) (2007); VA CODE ANN. § 46.2-1088.6 (2010). 
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increase the insured’s premium, apply a surcharge, refuse to apply a 
discount . . . place in a less favorable tier” or take other similar negative 
action solely on the basis of the owner’s refusal to allow access to 
recorded data.123  
 
[30] Vehicular tolling facilities have utilized emerging technology to 
collect vehicular tolls in a faster, more efficient manner.124  The use of 
systems such as EZPASS to collect tolls by reading data from the front 
windshield of the vehicle as it passes through a tolling facility has become 
increasingly popular in Virginia and across the United States.125  Not 
surprisingly, the General Assembly has legislated in this area.126  Section 
46.2-819.1 provides for the installation and use of a photo-monitoring 
system or an automatic vehicle identification system in certain toll 
facilities.127  This section provides that an “operator of any toll facility or 
the locality within which such toll facility is located may install and 
operate or cause to be installed and operated a photo-monitoring system or 
automatic vehicle identification system, or both . . . .”128  This affords the 
toll operator the ability to “send an invoice or bill for unpaid tolls to the 
registered owner of a vehicle as part of an electronic or manual toll 
collection process . . . .”129  Section 46.2-819.1 also provides that any data 
                                                            
123 VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2213.1 (2007). 
 
124 See Bob E. Lype, Employment Law and New Technologies: Emerging Trends 
Affecting Employers, 47-MAY TENN. B.J. 20, 24 (2011) (“[T]he ‘EZPass’ system . . . 
allows employees to pass toll gates on toll roads without stopping.”). 
 
125 Cf. Ian Goldberg, Austin Hill & Adam Shostack, Trust, Ethics, and Privacy, 81 B.U. 
L. REV. 407, 420 (2001) (“The [EZPass] system is coercive in nature, insofar as toll 
systems become more efficient and failure to participate in the program results in a 
substantial cost in time.”). 
 
126 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-819.1 (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-819.5 (2010).  
 
127 See VA. CODE ANN.§ 46.2-819.1(A). 
 
128 Id. 
 
129 Id. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology     Volume XVIII, Issue1 
 
 26 
collected by these systems is “limited exclusively to that information that 
is necessary for the collection of unpaid tolls,” and notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, toll operators may not sell solicit, market for any 
purpose, or disclose the data to any entity other than for toll collection 
purposes.130  Furthermore, it does not permit the data to be introduced as 
evidence in a court of competent jurisdiction, unless the court action is for 
determining a violation of Section 46.2-819.1.131 
 
[31] Finally, Section 46.2-819.5 provides for the use of photo-
monitoring or automatic vehicle identification systems in conjunction with 
the usage of the Dulles Access Highway to determine violations of a 
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority regulation regarding usage 
of the highway for non-airport purposes.132  The section has the same 
requirements and exceptions for the usage of the data collected, including 
photographs, microphotographs, and electronic images, as does Section 
46.2-819.1 explained above.133  It also requires the purging of data within 
30 days after the collection and reconciliation of fees and penalties.134 
 
[32] Although Virginia’s statutes direct the purging of data collected by 
these automated systems no later than thirty days after collection and 
reconciliation of unpaid tolls, as is also the case of data collected by the 
EDRs,135 this use of emerging technology for transportation related 
purposes directly impacts the extent to which an individual can expect to 
maintain privacy while traveling.  There also exists a greater potential for 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
130 Id. § 46.2-819.1(B). 
 
131 Id. 
 
132 VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-819.5 (2010). 
 
133 Id. § 46.2-819.5 (B); see id. § 46.2-819.1. 
 
134 Id. § 46.2-819.5(B). 
 
135 Id. § 46.2-1088.6(A). 
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improper use of this data by law enforcement, as compared to traditional 
or non-technological methods.136  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
[33] The rapid advancement of technological innovation in all areas of 
our society has created new opportunities for resolving the challenges of 
the 21st century.  We have faster and greater access to information in the 
global village through use of the Internet and its applications.  We also 
have more developed methods for accessing goods and services 
electronically.137  In the transportation area, using technology has enabled 
faster and greater access to services, the ability to transfer more quickly 
from one mode to another, as well as more choices regarding which mode 
can be accessed and when.138 
 
[34] These positive outcomes from technological innovation, however, 
have their downsides, including the potential for abuse of the individual’s 
privacy interests.139  Faster access to transportation has encouraged the 
electronic collection and maintenance of personal and vehicle data.140  The 
                                                            
136 See generally Don Oldenburg, The Snoop in Your Coupe, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2003, 
at A01 (discussing concerns about use of EDR by law enforcement). 
 
137 See, e.g., AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2011); 
ANGIE’S LIST, http://www.angieslist.com/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2011). 
 
138 See Carla Saulter, Does Better Technology Equal Better Transportation Choices?, 
CHOOSE YOUR WAY BELLEVUE BLOG (Mar. 31, 2011, 11:50 AM), 
http://www.chooseyourwaybellevue.org/blog/2011/03/does-better-technology-equal-
better-transportation-choices/. 
 
139 See Patrick R. Mueller, Comment, Every Time You Brake, Every Turn You Make--I'll 
Be Watching You: Protecting Driver Privacy in Event Data Recorder Information, 2006 
WIS. L. REV. 135, 166-67 (discussing the high value of EDR to parties involved in Civil 
and Criminal litigation). 
 
140 See Noam Cohen, As Data Collecting Grows, Privacy Erodes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/16/technology/16link.html (discussing services 
such as Zipcar and go520). 
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ability to employ symbiotic technological devices has improved the 
government’s ability to enforce the laws and investigate accidents to 
determine responsibility and/or liability.141  In the wake of the events of 
9/11 and the increase in concern about national security,142 individual 
rights have often been violated in protection of the homeland. 
 
[35] This discussion has outlined instances where advancing technology 
has pushed the limits of personal privacy.  The Supreme Court of the 
United States found in the United States Constitution a “zone of 
privacy,”143 but has since created a body of law that sets forth no clear 
pattern as to the limits of an individual’s reasonable expectation to protect 
their privacy, or the acceptable limits of government action.  Congress has 
enacted legislation, executive branch agencies have promulgated 
regulations, and industry groups have set standards to guide the access, 
handling, and disposition of personal information collected through 
transportation-related technology.144  Generally, these standards make 
strong efforts to minimize violations of personal privacy and set forth 
clear guidelines governing the release and dissemination of personal 
data.145  However, these patchwork guidelines often permit the release of 
personal information, otherwise thought to be private, to achieve public 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
141 See Oldenburg, supra note 136 (providing multiple examples of where EDR was used 
to convict criminals for driving related offenses). 
 
142 See Bennie G. Thompson, The National Counterterrorism Center: Foreign and 
Domestic Intelligence Fusion and the Potential Threat to Privacy, 6 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. 
& POL'Y 6, paras. 1, 7, 14 (2006). 
 
143 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
 
144 See, e.g., Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2006); 49 C.F.R. 
§§ 563.1, 563.2 (2010). 
 
145 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725. 
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purposes such as protecting the health and safety of traveling 
individuals.146  
 
[36] The legal landscape in Virginia reflects the federal standards for 
EDRs,147 and yet remains distinctive through legislation such as The 
Government Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act.148  In at 
least two cases, Virginia courts allowed data from EDR equipment 
admitted into evidence in a criminal proceeding,149 and held that travelers 
on public transportation modes have a lesser expectation of privacy than 
they do in hotel rooms or at home.150  Virginia permits the use of 
symbiotic technological applications, photo-monitoring systems, and 
automatic vehicle identification systems to collect tolls and enforce 
transportation regulations.151  However, with the exception of a handful of 
limited purposes, Virginia permits public disclosure of personal data.152 
 
[37] Taken as a whole, the Supreme Court of the United States, 
Congress and federal agencies, and Virginia’s courts and lawmakers have 
recognized the challenges that emerging technological applications have 
brought and have permitted this technology to be utilized in a number of 
ways, including law enforcement, while at the same time attempting to 
                                                            
146 See id. § 2721(b); ITS America’s Fair Information and Privacy Principles, ITS AM., 
2, http://www.itsa.org/images/mediacenter/itsaprivacyprinciples.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 
2011). 
 
147 See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1088.6 (2010). 
 
148 See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3800to -3809 (2008 & Supp. 2010). 
 
149 See Dupree v. Commonwealth, No. 0519-09-3, 2010 WL 1752581, at *3, *3 n.3 (Va. 
Ct. App. 2010); Nininger v. Commonwealth, No. 0450-09-03, 2010 WL 1752572, at *3, 
*3 n.3 (Va. Ct. App. 2010). 
 
150 See Londono v. Commonwealth, 579 S.E. 2d 641, 650-51 (Va. Ct. App. 2003). 
 
151 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.2-819.1, -819.5 (2010 & Supp. 2011). 
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ensure secure data collection.153  Although methods to protect personal 
data have been legally prescribed, lawmakers should recognize that the 
same technological innovations and applications that enabled society to 
advance may also hinder these protections and violate an individual’s 
legally protected privacy interests.154   
 
[38] For example, electronic tolling systems are “rife with privacy 
risks” and that anyone with a transponder reader can “steal the ID number 
off transponders . . . through the windshield [of a parked car], put the data 
on their device[ ] and pass through . . .  tolls for free, with the victim 
paying the bill.”155  Moreover, it is common to “hack” into databases or 
“phish” into email accounts to steal personal data, including credit card 
and bank account numbers.  As is usually the case, the law lags behind 
cutting edge innovations that impact individual rights.156  Emerging 
technology in transportation proves no exception.157  
 
[39] This article supports the conclusion that, in the face of technology 
advancements, greater efforts by the Congress and the General Assembly 
of Virginia have protected the personal privacy of the individual by 
prescribing that collected data must be kept secure and not disseminated 
                                                            
153 See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. §§ 563.1, 563.2 (2010).  See generally supra Parts II-III. 
 
154 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) (imposing limits on the 
government’s power to use thermal imaging technology to “shrink the realm of 
guaranteed privacy” by conducting a warrantless search of a home). 
 
155 Elinor Mills, Hacking Electronic-Toll Systems, CNET NEWS (Aug. 6, 2008, 4:37 PM), 
http://news.cnet.com/ 8301-1009_3-10009353-83.html.  
 
156 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33–34 (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of 
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157 See People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 447 (N.Y. 2009) (indicating that advances in 
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the significant risk of abuse). 
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except for narrow purposes.158  A second conclusion purports that, as 
technology is utilized to enforce speed limits and red light violations, 
collect tolls and enforce roadway restrictions, the public will challenge 
those intrusions.  As our system requires, the outcomes to these challenges 
is still unfolding in the courts.159  One thing is clear however, enforcement 
of the law through more sophisticated technological methods causes the 
individuals affected to bristle at the government’s broader reach.160  As 
one motorist, who received a ticket in the mail from Ridgeland, South 
Carolina—a town that employs speed cameras to enforce the speed limit 
on I-95 said: “I just don’t think it’s right.  If you get a ticket you should be 
stopped by an officer, know you have been stopped and have an 
opportunity to state your case.”161 
 
[40] While traveling in the “circulatory system”162 of the United States, 
is the right of privacy sacrificed for the health and convenience of the 
transportation system?  Has transportation technology struck the final nail 
into the coffin of personal privacy?  This article has shown that our legal 
institutions, which at times seem poised to summon the hearse, must 
continually respond to a public that heralds individual liberties and 
demands that privacy rights remain recognized, placed on life support, and 
protected.  
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